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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
THE MARYLAND BOULEVARD RULE: A TIME FOR 
CHANGE 
Maryland's boulevard rule has survived frequent challenge 
and the apparent harshness of its results in recent cases. 
The author examines the development and application of the 
rule and questions both the historical bases and judicial 
justifications for the rule's modern viability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several Maryland decisions in the past few years point once 
again to the need for a critical re-evaluation of the Maryland 
boulevard rule. 1 The stream of cases trying unsuccessfully to carve 
exceptions into the rule continues, and while inequity is no stranger 
to the application of this curious rule, the recent trend toward 
absoluteness in its interpretation by the courts is disturbing. 
In Creaser v. Owens,2 a school bus driver traveling on 
Stewartown Road near Gaithersburg, Maryland, stopped at a stop 
sign at the intersection of Stewartown and Goshen Roads and looked 
carefully to the left and right. Seeing no other vehicles, she began 
executing a left turn. A Cadillac traveling at an excessive speed on 
Goshen Road flew over a hill about two hundred feet from the 
intersection.3 Although the bus driver was powerless to prevent the 
collision that ensued, in her suit against the driver of the automobile 
she was held negligent as a matter of law under the boulevard rule, 
which precluded her recovery under contributory negligence 
principles.4 
An even harsher application of, the rule is found in Hensel v. 
Beckward. 5 On a moonless night, the driver of a car halted at an 
intersection stop sign. After he and his passenger twice looked both 
ways and observed no vehicles approaching on the intersecting 
highway, the driver proceeded into the intersection where his car 
was struck by a vehicle driven on the intersecting highway at high 
speed without lights.6 Permanently paralyzed, he also was held 
negligent as a matter of law, thus barring his recovery.7 
1. It has been over a decade since the last comprehensive analysis of the Maryland 
boulevard rule. Webb, Bothersome Boulevards, 26 MD. L. REV. 111 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Bothersome Boulevards]' 
2. 267 Md. 238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972). 
3. Id. at 241-43, 297 A.2d at 237-38. 
4. Id. at 245, 297 A.2d at 239. 
5. 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974). 
6. Id. at 428, 330 A.2d at 198. 
7. Id. at 432. 330 A.2d at 200. 
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Perhaps the ultimate boulevard rule case was presented in 
Johnson v. Dortch. 8 Johnson stopped his car at the stop sign posted 
at a "T" intersection in Baltimore. He looked both ways and, seeing 
no moving vehicles, began to execute a right tum. An accident 
ensued with another driver whom the evidence indicated was 
intoxicated, speeding, driving at night without headlights and 
operating on thE; wrong side of the road. 9 Johnson, found to be 
negligent as a matter of law, was precluded from recovery in his suit 
against the other driver. lo 
In each of these cases, a driver was held to have failed in an 
absolute duty to yield the right of way to traffic favored by a stop 
sign, and a finding of negligence was dictated by the boulevard rule. 
II. ORIGIN OF THE RULE 
Under Maryland's boulevard rule, a driver who is legally 
required to yield the right-of-way at an intersection (the unfavored 
driver) to another (the favored driver) is held negligent as a matter of 
law in the event. of an accident between the two within the 
intersection, regaI:dless of relative speeds, times and distances. I I By 
statute, a driver -approaching a through highwayl2 must yield the 
right-of-way to vehicles on the through highway;13 a driver faced 
with a stop sign. must yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the 
intersecting road;14 a driver faced by a yield sign must yield the right-
of-way ,to vehicles on the merging or intersecting road;15 a driver 
who approaches a highway from a private drive must yield the right-
of-way to vehicles on the highway;16 and a driver approaching a 
road from a cros~ov~r must yield the right-of-way to vehicles on the 
road. 17 The judicial construction and application of these statutory 
requirements is t~e ~oulevard rule. 18 By analogy the rule has been 
8. 27 Md. App. 605, 342 A.2d 326 (1975). 
9. Id. at 607-10, 342 A.2d at 328-30. 
10. Id. at 617, 342 A.id at 333. 
11. See, e.g., Creaser ,i. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 244, 297 A.2d 235, 238 (1972). 
12. Through highway means every highway or portion thereof on which 
vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way, and at the entrances 
to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law 
to yield right-of-way to vehicles on such through highway in obedience to 
either a stop sign, a yield sign or a yield-right-of-way sign when such 
signs are erected as provided in this article. 
MD. ANN. CODE art: 661,-2, § 1-198 (1970). 
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 661,-2, § 11-403(b) (1970). 
14. Id. § 11-403(c). 
15. Id. § 11-403(d). 
16. Id. § 11-404. 
17. Id. § 11-404.1. . 
18. The boulevard rule has been described as the judicial construction of MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 661,-2, §§ 11-401 to 404.1 (1970). Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 58, 309 
A.2d 481, 487 (1973). See also Schwier v. Gray, 277 Md. 631, 632 n.1, 357 A.2d 100, 
101 n.1 (1976). The judicial characterization of sections 11-401 and 11-402 as 
falling within the ambit of the boulevard rule is misleading, however, because in 
cases involving these sections, no automatic finding of negligence is imposed by 
the court. See, e.g., Nardone v. Underwood, 219 Md. 326, 149 A.2d 13 (1959); 
Meldrum v. Kellam Dist. Co., 211 Md. 504, 128 A.2d 400 (1957). 
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extended to situations in which drivers enter roads from traffic 
lights,19 parking lots20 or other open areas.21 
As the Maryland Court of Appeals has stated the rule, when "an 
unfavored driver is involved in an accident with a favored vehicle 
under circumstances where the boulevard rule is applicable then in a 
suit based on that collision the unfavored driver is deemed to be 
negligent as a matter of law."22 The court of appeals has rigidly 
adhered to the rule. As Judge Digges said, writing for the majority in 
Hensel, "[l]ike the Rock of Gibraltar we remain firm and will not 
allow [the boulevard rule] to be judically either bypassed or 
otherwise eroded through new waves of attack."23 A scrutiny of the 
origin and development of the boulevard rule reveals some 
disconcerting leaps along the path to the rigid position taken by the 
Maryland courts today. 
Maryland's first right of way statute for motor vehicles 
approaching intersections was enacted in 1916.24 It simply stated: 
"All vehicles shall have the right of way over other vehicles 
approaching at the intersecting roads frOQ1 the left, and shall give 
right of way to those approaching from the right."25 At a time when 
traffic control devices were scarce and the few automobiles on the 
roads were incapable of high speeds, this law seemingly attempted 
to prevent accidents and assess blame for those that did occur. In the 
cases arising under this statute, the circumstances of each accident 
were considered in determining the negligence vel non of both 
drivers. These circumstances included whether a right-of-way was 
properly yielded,26 width of the roads,27 speeds of the vehicles,28 
whether either driver was on the wrong side of the roadway,29 and 
other factors.30 In short, there was no finding of negligence as a 
matter of law, but rather, a weighing of the circumstances 
surrounding each accident served as the basis for determining 
liability. 
When automobiles and traffic control signs became more widely 
used and congestion became a problem, the legislature acted to allow 
motorists on certain roads to travel continuously in preference to 
19. Eastern Contractors v. State, 225 Md. 112, 169 A.2d 430 (1961), noted in 23 MD. L. 
REV. 172 (1963) (red traffic light creates "boulevard" for driver proceeding on 
green light); Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479, 255 A.2d 431 (1969) (flashing red 
light creates boulevard). 
20. Redmiles v. Muller, 29 Md. App. 304, 348 A.2d 291 (1975). 
21. Victor A. Pyles Co. v. Rehmann, 21 Md-. App. 686, 691, 321 A.2d 175, 179 (1974) 
("[T]hose who enter or cross a boulevard from fields or other curbs when no 
roadway intersects" have been subjected to application of the rule). 
22. Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 245, 297 A.2d 235, 239 (1972). 
23. 273 Md. 426, 427, 330 A.2d 196, 197 (1974). 
24. Law of April 18, 1916, ch. 687, § 163, 1916 Md. Laws 1605. 
25. [d. This statute remains in force today. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 lh, § 11-401 (1970). 
26. See, e.g., Chiswell v. Nichols, 137 Md. 291, 112 A. 363 (1920). 
27. Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 135 A. 587 (1926). 
28. [d. 
29. Friedman v. Hendler Creamery Co., 158 Md. 131, 148 A. 426 (1930). 
30. See, e.g., Chiswell v. Nichols, 137 Md. 291, 307, 112 A. 363, 368 (1920). 
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vehicles traveling on intersecting roads. In 1929, several provisions 
were added to the 19'16 right-of-way statute, one'of which authorized 
the State Roads Commission to designate main or through highways 
by erecting stop signs at the entrances to those highways from 
intersecting roads. 31 A driver facing such a stop sign was required to 
come to a full stop and yield the right-of-way to all drivers traveling 
on the favored highway.32 This 1929 legislation included a similar 
provision allowing motorists on paved .highways to proceed in 
preference to those on unpaved highways.33 Once again, the 
unfavored driver was required to come to a full stop and to yield the 
right-of-way to all {irivers approaching on the favored highway.34 
The language of the.1929 legislation was similar to the original 1916 
statute in that both, required a yielding of the right-of-way to "all 
vehicles" within ~ specified class, and neither made any mention of 
speed, time, distance. or other factors. Yet the 1929 provisions served 
as a judical springboard to the inflexible boulevard rule applied by 
Maryland courts today. It seems odd that the later provisions have 
been subjected to an interpretation differing so significantly from 
that accorded the original statute when the legislature prefaced 
neither with a sti'l,tement of purpose or intent. The only apparent 
difference between the statutes is that in one case a driver must yield 
the right-of-way to traffic approaching from a single direction and in 
other cases he must yield the right-of-way to traffic coming from two 
directions. Indeed, no legislative mandate35 for a vastly differing 
interpretation between the statutes is readily apparent. 
The loose wOJ,"q~ng of the early boulevard cases makes them 
susceptible to several interpretations. Typical of these early cases is 
Blinder v. Monaghan,36 in which a taxi-cab driver, whose view of the 
favored road waso~~tructed by a bus, obeyed a stop sign but did not 
wait for the bus to move before he entered the intersection. He had 
noticed a truck approaching behind the bus on the favored road but 
lost sight of it whep the bus stopped. The cab proceeded into the 
intersection and collided with the truck, which had by that time 
passed the bus.37 On these facts, the court found that the cab driver 
had entered the favored road in disregard of his duty to stop and 
yield the right-of-way. Although his vision was temporarily blocked 
and his previous sighting of the truck had given him reason to 
anticipate its approach, the cab driver proceeded blindly into the 
intersection rather.. than waiting to ascertain whether the 
31. Law of April 2, 1929, ch. 224, 1929 Md. Laws 616 (now codified in MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 661/2, §§1-198, 1l-403(c), and 15-105(a». 
32.Id. 
33. Id. at 615. 
34.Id. 
35. The mandatory finding of negligence on the part of an un favored driver has been 
called a "legislative mandate." Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 427, 330 A.2d 
196, 197 (1974). 
36. 171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31 (1936). 
37. Id. at 81-83, 188 A. at 33-34. 
/ 
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intersection was clear. The court drew an analogy to a case where a 
driver ran a red light and collided with another driver who was 
proceeding through a green light and had no opportunity to avert a 
collision.38 It was eminently clear to the court in both of these cases 
that the proximate cause of the collisions was the unfavored driver's 
disregard of "explicit and mandatory rules:"39 Under ordinary 
standards of care and negligence principles, the court in Blinder at 
this point had said enough to dispose of the case~ It went on to state, 
however, that when such a disregard of explicit and mandatory rules 
is found and a collision has ensued, "the collision can only be 
attributed to [the unfavored driver's] negligence."4o Because of that 
statement, Blinder was not to be remembered as just another 
intersection accident case but rather as an earlY-formulation of the 
boulevard rule.41 Thus the court fell into the common legal trap of 
making a statement that it considered to be a concise determination 
of the particular case before it, but which lent-itself to sweeping 
future application far beyond the contemplation of its issuers. Resort 
to such a general statement was unnecessary'in Blinder because a 
weighing of the individual circumstances could have pointed to no 
other conclusion than that the unfavored cab" dnver was at fault. 
Indeed, the court said "[n]either argument nonluthority are needed 
to characterize such conduct as negligent."42 ;; 
Upon a reading of Carlin v. Worthington/3 decided a year after 
Blinder, it is apparent that a finding of negligence as a matter of law 
whenever a favored and unfavored driver collide' at an intersection 
was not contemplated by the court in Blinder.' Judge Sloan, writing 
for the court, quoted the general rule stated in BUnder and explained 
it as an accurate statement of the law but not· one which should be 
made to the jury as an instruction.44 Such an instruction would have 
been deficient in not submitting to the jury the question of the 
unfavored driver's violation of his duty to stop and yield the right-of-
way as the proximate cause of the collision. The opinion indicated 
that, depending upon such circumstances as the favored vehicle's 
speed and distance from the intersection, whether the unfavored 
driver came to a full stop before entering the iritersection, and the 
degree to which his vision was obstructed- by a building, the 
unfavored driver's alleged violation of duty ~ight not have been a 
38. [d. at 84, 188 A. at 34 (citing Sun Cab Co. v, Faulkner, 163 Md. 477, 163 A. 194 
(1932». . 
39, [d. 
40. [d. The unfavored cab driver's negligence barred recovery in his suit against the 
favored truck driver. 
41. See, e.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 244, 297 A.2d 235, 238 (1972) (citing 
Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31 (1936». 
42. Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md, 77, 83, 188' A. 31, 34 '(1936). 
43. 172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356 (1937). In Carlin, a favored truck driver sued the driver of 
an unfavored vehicle which entered the favored roadway, where a collision 
occurred. 
44, [d. at 510, 192 A. at 358. 
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cause of the accident:45 "When the un favored driver has time, if the 
favored driver is so far from the intersection that he will not arrive 
there before the crossing is cleared by the other, if he is not speeding, 
it is not negligence of an unfavored driver to enter.'?46 The un favored 
driver must, however, have his vehicle under control so as to allow 
him to yield the right-of-wayY Fault was properly to be determined 
by a jury after weighing the attendant circumstances. This writer 
can only speculate that if some of the more extreme boulevard cases 
of recent years had come before the Carlin court in 1937, the court 
would have weighed more carefully the predicament of unfavored 
drivers whose vehicles were under control but who, because of the 
conduct of the favored drivers or other circumstances, had little or no 
opportunity to avert a collision. 
It was in Greenfeld v. Hook 48 in 1939 that the court, while 
maintaining that it· was merely following consistent case law, 
actually tightened its stance on the duties of unfavored drivers. 
Some of the court's language has achieved notoriety through its 
frequent quotation: 
The obvious and essential purpose of such rules is to 
accelerate the flow of traffic over through highways by 
permitting travellers thereon to proceed within lawful speed 
limits without interruption. That purpose would be 
completely frustrated if such travellers were required to slow 
down at every intersecting highway .... If, however, the 
relative rights of travellers on the two types of highway are 
held to depend upon nice calculations of speed, time and 
distance the rule would encourage recklessness and the 
privilege of the uninterrupted travel would mean little more 
than the privilege of having a jury guess in the event of a 
collision whose guess was wrong. 49 
The context in which the court noted the "obvious and essential 
purpose" of the statutes requiring unfavored drivers to stop and 
yield the right-of-way is worth mention. That statement was made in 
disapproval of a proposed jury instruction to the effect that a favored 
driver was required to reduce his speed when approaching street 
crossings. 50 Clearly no such duty existed by statute or judicial 
decision. When the language is read out of context,51 it appears that 
45. Id. at 507, 192 A, at 357. 
46. Id. at 508, 192 A, at 358 (emphasis added). 
47.Id. 
48. 177 Md. 116, 8 A,2d 888 (1939). In Greenfeld, an unfavored driver sued the driver. 
of a favored vehicle for injuries sustained in a collision. On the facts of the case, 
the unfavored driver was negligent, but the court held that her recovery would 
not be precluded if the favored driver had a last clear chance to avert a collision. 
49. Id. at 125-26, 8 A.2d at 892-93. 
50. Id. at 120, 8 A.2d at 890. 
51. These statements are often quoted without reference to their context. See, e.g., 
Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 246, 297 A,2d 235, 239 (1972) . 
...... 
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requiring the favored driver to slow down at intersections was, in the 
court's view, the sole alternative to a required finding of negligence. 
While that inference is not supported by the text of the opinion, the 
prohibition against "nice calculations of speed; 'time' and distance" 
has effectively foreclosed the remaining alternative, a weighing of 
the' circumstances surrounding a boulevard collision. 
: Although the courts have not found it 'useful to quote this 
language, ·Greenfeld went· on to say that the unfavored driver was 
not 'negligent as a matter of law in proceeding.. from the median 
access road into the favored driver's side of :the roadway.52 Her 
negligence was in her admitted failure to look-in'the direction from 
which oncoming traffic would approach after she entered that side of 
the favored roadway.5.1 Greenfeld's use as precedent, however, has 
been no different than if the court found the .. unfavored driver to 
have been negligent as a matter of law simply because an accident 
occurred. The court denied unfavored drivers the opportunity to 
vindicate themselves by showing relative speeds, times and 
distances; the prohibition against these "nice calculations'; deprived 
unfavored drivers of the most effective means of escaping a finding 
of negligence. Thus Greenfeld and its progeny-have brought the 
court( to the position it takes today. Whenever :the boulevard rule is 
applicable, however, the required finding that"th~ un favored driver 
is negligent as a matter of law is . said to ._be a "legislative 
mandate."54 
There is no basis in the right-of-way legislation nor its history 
for holding the unfavored driver negligent as"a matter of law. The 
rule was judicially created. Yet in Creaser, the-court stated "[i]f the 
meaning and application of the 'boulevard rule!. is to be changed, it 
must be done by the Legislature and not by judiCial fiat."55 
III. APPLICATION OF THE RULE 
When an unfavored driver has entered the.favored roadway and 
merged into the flow of traffic before a collision ·occurs between his 
vehicle and another on the favored road, he ha~' shed his status as 
anunfavored driver and will escape application of the rule.56 If a 
question of merger is presented, the trier of fact decides whether the 
accident occurred within the intersection or so dose to it that the 
entering unfavored driver has interfered with the favored driver's 
right-of-way into or through the intersectionY The threshold 
question in each case, then, is whether an entry and merger have 
52. 177 Md. at 133. 8 A.2d at 896. 
53. Id . 
. 54. See note 35, supra. 
55. 267 Md. 238, 249, 297 A.2d 235, 241 (1972). 
56. See, e.p., McCann v. Crum, 231 Md. 65. 188 A.2d 537 (1963) . 
. 57. See Great Coastal Express v. Schruefer, _ Md. _, _;369 A.2d 118, 127 (1977); 
Paul v. Lyons, 34 Md. App. 93, 94. 366 A.2d 410, 411-12. 
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taken place or, as it was so aptly put by Judge Liss writing for the 
court of special appeals in Paul v. Lyons,58 "Is this a piece of the 
Rock?"59 
If the boulevard rule applies, the unfavored driver is negligent as 
a matter of law.60 This is so even though the conduct of the favored 
driver, such as driving without lights at night, prevented the 
unfavored driver from knowing of his presence in time to comply 
with the duty to yield the right-of-way61 and even though the 
unfavored driver's view may be blocked by topographical or other 
visual obstructions.62 
In Creaser, the court of appeals subscribed to a concern voiced 
by Judge Gilbert in his dissent in the lower appellate court.63 Judge 
Gilbert believed that if an unfavored driver whose vision of a 
favored road was obstructed were to be relieved from a mandatory 
finding of negligence and allowed to recover from a speeding favored 
driver, favored drivers would be placed in the untenable position of 
having to know in advance what obstacles would obscure the 
unfavored driver's vision.64 Thus, it was feared, the right-of-way 
statutes would be rendered meaningless.65 In adopting this 
reasoning, the court of appeals in Creaser reviewed its substantial 
number of boulevard rule opinions and found none in which there 
was "any suggestion" that the topography of an area limiting the 
unfavored driver's view of the boulevard would relieve him of the 
absolute duty to yield the right-of-way.66 
When Creaser is considered with such cases as Hensel and 
Johnson, it becomes clear that neither topography of the area nor 
any other circumstance beyond the control of an unfavored driver 
will excuse him from the mandatory finding of negligence made by 
Maryland courts today. 
Greenfeld is often cited as precedent for the boulevard rule,6? but 
that case contains certain qualifications. Mter noting that the 
purpose of the boulevard statutes was to permit favored drivers to 
proceed within lawfu"l speed limits,68 the Greenfeld court explained, 
"[t]here are many situations in which the driver of an automobile 
entering a favored from an unfavored highway may without 
negligence be endang~red by traffic over and along the same."69 The 
58. 34 Md. App. 93, 366 A.2d 410 (1976). 
59. [d. at 94, 366 A.2d at 411. 
60. See note 11, supra. 
61. See text accompanying notes 5-7, supra. 
62. See text accompanying notes 2-4, supra. 
63. 267 Md. 238, 249-50, 297 A.2d 235, 241 (1972). 
64. Owens v. Creaser, 14 Md. App. 593, 610, 288 A.2d 394, 403 (1972). 
65. [d. at 610, 288 A.2d at403, cited in Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. at 249-50,288 A.2d 
at 403. 
66. 267 Md. at 243, 297 A.2d at 238. 
67. [d. at 246, 297 A.2d at 239. 
68. See text accompanying note 49, supra. 
69. 177 Md. at 130, 8 A.2d at 894 (emphasis added). 
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court gave examples of such situations: dense fog, children darting 
out, mechanical failure and curves and grades which prevent a view 
of approaching traffic. 70 This proviso, however, seems to have been 
ignored in the intervening years. It was considered and dismissed ill 
Creaser on the alternative grounds that it either was intended to 
apply only to a last clear chance situation or authorized an exception 
to the boulevard rule which later cases have eliminated. 71 Neither of 
these explanations, however, fully disposes of the issue. The doctrine 
of last clear chance is predicated upon negligence of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant, the consequences of which the 
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid through the use of 
ordinary care.72 With respect to its examples, the Greenfeld court 
stated that the unfavored driver may be "without negligence." It is 
thus unlikely that the examples were intended to apply only to last 
clear chance situations. Assuming, on the other hand, that the 
statement authorized an exception to the boulevard rule, if indeed 
Greenfeld expounded such a rule, to say that the exception has been 
whittled away by later cases is to say that the rule as it exists is 
neither a legislative mandate nor an exclusively legislative matter. 
When a favored driver sues an unfavored driver, the plaintiff 
may be precluded from recovery if he is shown to have been 
inattentive and thus contributorily negligent. 73 Likewise, the favored 
driver may incur liability to parties other than the unfavored driver 
by his contributory negligence. 74 These cases have been rare, 
however, because of the prohibition against "nice calculations of 
speed, time and distance" stemming from Greenfeld. 75 If, in order to 
find the favored driver contributorily negligent, the jury must 
indulge in these nice calculations, it is improper to submit that issue 
to the jury.76 Kopitzki v. Boyd,77 however, recently limited this 
prohibition. In that case, a passenger sued her host driver who was 
the favored driver in a boulevard collision. Affirming a judgment for 
the passenger, the court of appeals considered evidence of the host 
driver's high speed and inattentiveness and concluded that it was 
sufficient to overcome the prohibition against nice calculations.78 
The question of the favored driver's negligence was thus properly 
70. Id. at 130, 8 A.2d at 894-95. 
71. 267 Md. 238, 248, 297 A.2d 235, 240. 
72. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 427-33 (1971). For a discussion of the doctrine of 
last clear chance in the context of the boulevard rule, see Trionfo v. Hellman, 250 
Md. 12, 241 A.2d 554 (1968). 
73. See, e.g., Schwier v. Gray, 277 Md. 631, 357 A.2d 100 (1976). Contributory 
negligence requires inattentiveness on the part of the favored driver. See 
Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976). 
74. See, e.g., Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976). 
75. See text accompanying note 49, supra. 
76. See, e.g., Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md. App. 49, 60-61, 309 A.2d 481, 489 (1973). 
77. 277 Md. 491, 355 A.2d 471 (1976). 
78. Id. at 497, 355 A.2d at 474-75. 
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submitted to the jury. Kopitzki is significant in that it recognized 
that the prohibition has some limit in Maryland courts. 79 
'A month after Kopitzki, the court of appeals decided Schwier v. 
Gray.80 In Schwier, a favored motocyclist collided with an unfavored 
driver en~ering Annapolis Road, the favored highway. The favored 
driver sued to recover damages from the unfavored driver. In 
affirming a judgment for the unfavored driver, the court held that 
the issue of the motorcyclist's contributory negligence was properly 
submitted. to the jury.81 The court concluded that evidence of the 
motorcyclist's negligence, including excessive speed and swerving 
across lanes, was proper for the jury to consider.82 While, arguably, 
the speed· and weaving of the favored driver may have been so 
excessive or so erratic as to deprive the prohibition against nice 
calculations of application in: this case under the Kopitzki rationale, 
it is noteworthy that the court did not even pay lip service to the 
.prohibition. On the contrary, the court based its approval of the 
-submission of the. favored driver's contributory negligence to the 
jury on this evidence simply on the traditional basis that reasonable 
minds could have differed as to whether his conduct constituted 
contributory negligence. 83 
The prohibition against nice calculations has long been an 
impediment to jury consideration of the favored driver's negligence. 
-Read together, . Kopitzki and Schwier.indicate that favored drivers 
may no longer be able to flaunt the rules of the road with virtual 
impunity. In those- boulevard cases in which their negligence 
contributes to the injury of some. party other than the unfavored 
driver, . they' risk liability, and when they contribute to their own 
injury, they maybe precluded from recovering from the unfavored 
driver. 
When sued by an unfavored driver, the favored driver may be 
liable despite the unfavored' driver's contributory negligence if the 
.doctrine of last clear: chance is applicable. 84 The prohibition against 
nice calculations also applies in these situations, but even if the 
prohibition has been relaxed, as recent cases would indicate, a 
further complication stifles an unfavored driver's opportunity to 
recover. In the context of a boulevard case, the doctrine of last clear 
chance contemplates an act of negligence by the unfavored driver 
which comes to an end, pladng him in peril which is realized by the 
n~gligence ofthe favored dri\ier in failing to avoid the collision.85 An 
79. Judge Northrop, on the federal bench, had observed long before Kopitzki that 
when calculations' of relative speeds, times and distances in boulevard cases are 
not close, this prohibition is inapplicable. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle Co., 206 F. 
Supp. 120, 127 (D. Md. 1962). 
80. 277 Md. 631, 357 A.2d 100 (1976). 
81. [d. at 636, 357 A.2d at 103. 
82. [d. 
83. [d .• 
84. See text accompanying note 72, supra. 
8il. [d. 
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unfavored driver will be continually negligent, however, from the 
moment he enters the boulevard intersection until the moment of 
collision.86 This continuing negligence, which probably only a 
mechanical failure or some other unique circumstance could 
eliminate,87 is incompatible with a theory of recovery predicated 
upon the favored driver's last clear chance.88 Thus the doctrine holds 
only a phantom hope for unfavored drivers. 
Perhaps the most perplexing boulevard case of recent years is 
Nicholson v. Page. 89 Nicholson seems to have avoided the rule 
simply because its imposition would have had a very harsh result. 
That case involved a westbound unfavored driver who stopped at a . 
boulevard intersection and looked to his left. Traffic in the only 
northbound lane was waiting behind a stopped bus. The unfavored 
driver-plaintiff was waved on by the bus driver and moved his car 
forward· to cross the· intersection, looking to his right to observe 
southbound traffic on the boulevard. The defendant driver, who had 
been waiting behind the bus, then swung around the bus on 'the 
wrong side of the road to make a left turn at the intersection. The 
vehicles of the plaintiff and defendant collided at the intersection.90 
The court of appeals affirmed a judgment for the unfavored driver-
plaintiff, concluding that a proper application of the boulevard rule 
did not require a holding that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law.91 The affirmance was based, in part, on a lack of 
foreseeability that the favored driver would pass the bus by traveling 
in the southbound lane.92 Surely it is no more foreseeable that a 
favored driver will commit any of the other serious acts of negligence 
with which boulevard cases have been replete. Perhaps Nicholson 
recognized a relinquishment of the right-of-way by the favored 
driver, or perhaps the court was simply moved by the predicament in 
which the unfavored driver, who was a police officer,93 found 
himself. Whatever its rationale, Nicholson has proved to be a 
mirage, as the court has refused to extend its reasoning beyond a 
virtual duplication of the particular facts of that case.94 
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A significant majority of the states allow a finding that an 
unfavored driver has yielded the right-of-way to favored traffic after 
complying with a traffic control sign, even though an accident 
occurs within the intersection between himself and a favored 
86. See, e.g., Trionfo v. Hellman, 250 Md. 12, 241 A.2d 554 (1968). 
87. See Bothersome Boulevards, supra note 1, at 121. 
88.Id. 
89. 255 Md. 659, 259 A.2d 319 (1969). 
90. Id. at 660-61, 259 A.2d at 321. 
91. Id. at 665, 259 A.2d at 323. 
92. Id. at 667, 259 A.2d at 324. 
93. Id. at 660, 259 A.2d at 321. 
94. E.g., Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 247, 297 A.2d 235, 240 (1972). 
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driver. 95 In these states, a case which, if brought in the Maryland 
courts, would be subject to the boulevard rule is approached in the 
same manner as non-boulevard rule automobile accident cases in 
Maryland, that is, the negligence vel non of both drivers is 
determined upon a consideration of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the accident. 96 Of course, the unfavored driver may be 
found negligent in such situations, but he is not held negligent as a 
matter of law. For example, a case duplicating the facts of Creaser 
has come before an Illinois district court97 and a case duplicating the 
facts of Hensel before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.98 In both, 
a jury verdict was affirmed for the plaintiff-unfavored driver who 
was not found to be negligent himself. 
The wording of many state right-of-way statutes, however, is 
similar to that of the Uniform Vehicle Code, requiring that the right-
of-way be yielded to vehicles which are already in the intersection or 
are so close to the intersection as to constitute an "immediate 
hazard."99 Under these statutes, the class of drivers to whom the 
right-of-way must be yielded is limited by the words of the statute, 
and courts are thus spared the decision of whether or not to supply a 
limitation on· the basis of presumed legislative intent. Maryland's 
intersection right-of-way statutes contain no such express limitation 
and the courts have refused to supply one of their own accord. 
Although the absence in other states of a mandatory finding of 
negligence when a driver on the favored road was speeding might be 
attributed to the "immediate hazard" language of the Uniform Code 
provision, that provision does not explain the absence of mandatory 
findings in other circumstances, such as in the case of unlit vehicles 
or topographical obstructions to the unfavored driver's vision. A 
favored vehicle may not be detectable by the un favored driver even 
95. See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 315, 315-25 (1965). 
96. See, e.g., Safirstein v. Nunes, 241 Cal. App. 2d 416, 50 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1966). 
97. Edmond v. Wertheimer Cattle Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 389, 153 N.E.2d 870 (1958). An 
unfavored entering driver sued a speeding favored driver who was hidden by a 
hill and a curve before collision. A jury verdict for the unfavored driver was 
affirmed. 
98. Enfield v. Stout, 400 Pa. 6, 161 A.2d 22 (1960). Evidence that a favored driver did 
not have his car under proper control and was driving without lights was held to 
support a jury verdict in favor of the driver and occupants of the unfavored 
vehicle. 
99. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 11-403(b)(Supp. 1970) (emphasis added): 
Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic signal, every 
driver of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop 
sign shall stop ... at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before 
entering the' crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, 
then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a 
view of approaching traffic on the intersecting-roadway before entering 
the intersection. After ... having stopped, the driver shall yield the 
right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from 
another highway or which is approaching so closely on said highway as 
to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is 
moving across or within the intersection. 
See also: id. (Historical Notes and Statutory Annotations are contained therein). 
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when it is very close to the intersection. The difference in wording of 
the right-of-way statutes, then, does not solely account for the 
differences between the interpretations accorded them by Maryland 
courts and those accorded them by the courts of other states. 
The actions of the Maryland legislature with respect to the 
relationship between motor vehicle law and the boulevard rule have 
not been consistent. Had the legislature done nothing, that inaction 
might have been read as a tacit approval of the rule as formulated 
by the courts. lOO If, on the other hand, the legislature was inclined to 
change the rule, it could have done several things. If it had added 
the "immediate hazard" language of the Uniform Code,lOl limiting 
the class of drivers to whom the unfavored driver was obligated to 
yield the right-of-way, mandatory findings might have been 
eliminated, at least when the favored driver was traveling signifi-
cantly in excess of the speed limit. If it redefined the term "right-of-
way" to conform to the Uniform Vehicle Code definition that only 
those drivers who are proceeding lawfully are granted a preference 
to proceed before other traffic,lo2 mandatory findings might have 
been eliminated when the favored driver was guilty of a significant 
violation of law. There are, of course, many other ways in which the 
legislature could have modified the boulevard rule, but it is 
reasonably certain that these two steps would have sent a clear 
message to the courts that the legislature wanted the boulevard rule 
changed. 
What the legislature did in 1970 was to adopt substantially the 
Uniform Vehicle Code's definition of "right-of-way"103 while, by the 
same legislation, recodifying the right-of-way statutes which have 
provided the judicial basis for the boulevard rule. 104 Although the 
new definition of "right-of-way" seems incompatible with the 
boulevard rule as it exists today, the legislature gave no indic~tion of 
an intent to modify or eliminate the rule. The legislative will with 
respect to the boulevard rule could certainly bear clarific~tion. 
V. A DIVIDED JUDICIARY 
A division among the ranks of the Maryland judiciary with 
respect to the boulevard rule is made apparent by the way in which 
the appellate courts have communicated with each other concerning 
the rule. Both 9reaser and Hensel went to the court of special 
appeals first, and the unfavored drivers were allowed recovery.105 
100. Since Shriner v. Mullhousen, 210 Md. 104, 114-15, 122 A.2d 570, 575 (1956), the 
Maryland courts have so read asserted legislative inaction. 
101. See note 99, supra. 
102. UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 1-156 (1968). 
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66112, § 1-175 (1970). 
104. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66112, §§ 11-401.1 to 11-403. 
105. Beckward v. Hensel, 20 Md. App. 544, 316 A.2d 309 (1974); Owens v. Creaser, 14 
Md. App. 593, 288 A.2d 394 (1972). The court of special appeals held that these 
cases presented exceptions to the boulevard rule. 
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These decisions were then reversed by the court of appeals, which 
indicated that it would allow no exceptions to the boulevard rule. 106 
Twice rebuffed, it is not surprising that the court of special appeals 
applied the boulevard rule to preclude the unfavored driver from 
recovering in Johnson,107 where the favored driver was chargeable 
with an incredible array of simultaneous acts of negligence. The 
court of appeals denied certiorari. lOB 
It was undoubtedly with tongue well in cheek that Judge Liss, 
speaking for the lower appellate court in Paul v. Lyons,109 said, "[ w ]e 
believe that our decision in this case does not disturb the pristine 
beauty of the Rock and that the 'boulevard rule' remains the beacon 
which our superiors intended it to be."llo 
It may be of at least some encouragement to those who would 
modify the boulevard rule that in Hensel, the court of appeals 
applied the rule by only a four to two margin.11l In a dissenting 
opinion concurred in by Judge Levine, Judge Smith argued that 
when a favored driver conceals his presence on the highway from an 
unfavored driver, an exception to the boulevard rule should be 
recognized because a driver should not be held to a duty which 
cannot be met.1l2 The judicial climate appears to be ripening for a 
modification of this tenacious doctrine. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The term "right-of-way" was redefined in 1970 as part of a 
massive revision of the Maryland Motor Vehicle Code,113 the 
announced purpose of which was to parallel the format of the 
Uniform Vehicle Code.1l4 Formerly, "right-of-way" was defined in 
Maryland as "the privilege of the immediate use of the highway."115 
This was the statutory definition of the term in force throughout the 
years during which the court formulated and fortified the boulevard 
rule. In 1970, however, "right-of-way" was redefined as "the right of 
one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference 
to another vehicle or pedestrian."1l6 
While there is no evidence that the legislature intended to 
change the boulevard rule with this new language, the arguable 
import of the new definition is that by proceeding in an unlawful 
106. Hensel v. Beckward, 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974); Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 
238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972). 
107. 27 Md. App. 605, 342 A.2d 326 (1975). 
108. Id. at 606, 342 A.2d at 326. 
109. 34 Md. App. 93, 366 A.2d 410 (1976). 
110. Id. at 98, 366 A.2d at 414. 
111. 273 Md. 426, 330 A.2d 196 (1974). 
112. Id. at 432-33, 330 A.2d at 200-01. 
113. Forward to MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PROPOSED 
MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE LAws REVISION (1969). 
114. Id. Compare UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 1-156 (1968) with MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 66112, § 1-175 (1970). 
115. MD. ANN. CODE art 661f2, § 2(45) (1957). 
116. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66112, § 1-175 (emphasis added). 
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manner, one might forfeit the right to proceed "in preference to 
another vehicle or pedestrian." Without question, there are minor 
violations of law that ought not deprive a favored driver of his right-
of-way, such as driving with a cracked window or broken turn 
signal. But in the many boulevard cases in which a favored driver 
has been guilty of significant violations of law such as intoxication, 
reckless speeding, failing to use lights at night, driving on the wrong 
side of the road or a combination of the above, he should be denied 
an absolute preference over other drivers by the very definition of 
the term "right-of-way." To date neither Maryland appellate court 
has taken cognizance of this definitional change as it relates to the 
boulevard rule. Objectively, though, the court of appeals is unlikely 
to change the boulevard rule on the basis of this redefinition alone. 
The court has so locked itself in by its decisions in the seven years 
since this redefinition was enacted· that to grasp it now as a 
legislative change of the rule would place the court in the awkward 
position of having to explain why it did not take cognizance of the 
change earlier. 
If the legislature were to add to the intersectional right-of-way 
statutes the express qualification of the Uniform Vehicle Code that 
the class of vehicles on the favored road to which the right-of-way 
must be yielded are those already in the intersection or close enough 
thereto to constitute an immediate hazard, the court might then feel 
free at least to limit application of the rule. ll7 
In view of the legislature's inaction, however, if the Maryland 
boulevard rule is to be abrogated, the onus must ultimately lie on the 
court of appeals, which created the rule. Neither the previously 
existing right-of-way statutes nor the legislative history of the 
statutes through which the rule is applied lend any support to it. The 
process by which the court has come to assume its current stance is 
best characterized as "bootstrapping." The court has gradually 
created a rule of law, ascribed it to the legislature without warrant 
and then finding support for it in the legislature's failure to act. 
This straw foundation is meager support for so staunch a rule of law. 
In non-boulevard automobile accident cases, the jury is 
permitted to weigh the relevant facts and circumstances in 
determining any negligence of the parties. If the jury is competent to 
117. During the 1976 session of the Maryland legislature, three bills were proposed 
which would have altered the boulevard rule, but all failed: H. 1853, "Motor 
Vehicles·Boulevard Rule," February 26, 1976 (this was a curious proposal, simply 
requiring the favored driver to operate his vehicle in a "prudent and careful 
manner"); S. 703, "Motor Vehicles·Boulevard Rule," February 17, 1976 (this 
proposal would have adopted "immediate hazard" language qualifying the 
boulevard rule statutes); H. 932, "Vehicle Laws·'Boulevard Rule'," January 21, 
1976 (this proposal would have prohibited construing the boulevard statutes 
against an unfavored driver when the favored driver's conduct concealed his 
presence). 
The only boulevard rule bill in the 1977 session was a virtual re-write of S. 
703 of the 1976 session. S. 367, "Motor Vehicles-Boulevard Rule," January 25, 
1977, also failed. 
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do so in these cases, it is also competent to do so iIi boulevard cases. 
There is nothing inherent in the nature of a boulevard case which 
requires that a jury's determination be preempted by a mandatory 
finding of negligence imposed by the court. On the contrary, there is 
strong reason why a mandatory finding of negligence on the part of 
an unfavored driver should not be made. Favored drivers should be 
encouraged to obey traffic laws, and a rule which, in effect, relieves 
them of liability when they have not done so removes a powerful 
incentive for complying with these laws. Abolishing the rule would 
also avoid the harsh results which obtain when a driver is held to a 
duty which he cannot meet, such as when the favored driver's 
conduct or some physical circumstance has prevented an entering 
driver from knowing of a favored vehicle's presence on the roadway. 
The courts should treat boulevard cases like other automobile 
accident cases, entrusting to the triers of fact the determination of 
negligence vel non based on a consideration of the relevant 
circumstances including relative speeds, times and distances. This 
may be done with the knowledge that Maryland's right-of· way 
statutes will not thus be rendered meaningless, as was feared in 
Creaser, 118 unless right-of-way statutes in force in the majority of 
states in this country are also meaningless. 
John William Debelius III 
ADDENDUM 
Since the initial printing of this article, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals has filed its opinions in Dean v. Redmiles, No. 24 (Ct. App., 
April 19, 1977) and Covington v. Gernert, No. 69 (Ct. App., May 31, 
1977). Both cases will be of major consequence in the application of 
the boulevard rule. 
In the context of a suit against the estate of a favored driver 
brought on behalf of his passenger, it 'was held in Dean that in a suit 
by a passenger of the favored or unfavored driver against the 
favored driver, a jury question as to the negligence vel non of the 
favored driver is presented by evidence of his excessive speed if it 
was a proximate cause of the accident. Apparently, this is so without 
regard to the dependence of such evidence upon nice calculations of 
speed, time and distance. In Dean, the speed of the favored driver 
was variously estimated between five and twenty miles per hour in 
excess of the posted fifty mile per hour speed limit. In its discussion, 
the court seemed to imply that the prohibition against nice 
calculations is nothing more than a supportive statement for the 
principle that contributory negligence as a matter of law bars the 
unfavored driver's recovery in a suit against the favored driver. 
118. See text accompanying notes 63-65, supra. 
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Thus, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the court of 
special appeals in Redmiles v. Muller, 29 Md. App. 304, 348 A.2d 291 
(1975). 
Chief Judge Murphy dissented vigorously from the Dean 
majority opinion, viewing it as a major departure from prior cases 
which had made inattention of the favored driver a requisite to his 
liability. "Inattention" had always required a showing of more than 
mere excessive speed. See, e.g., Harper v. Higgs, 255 Md. 24, 169 
A.2d 661 (1961). Judge Murphy foresaw the abandonment of the 
"eminently sensible" prohibition against nice calculations of speed, 
time and distance in all boulevard cases and the "unfortunate" 
downfall of the favored driver from his exalted position in that 
liability may now be predicated merely upon evidence of his 
excessive speed. 
It is Covington, however, which has the potential to severly 
restrict application of the boulevard rule. The defendant was 
driving the wrong way on a one-way favored street. The plaintiff, 
approaching an intersection with the through street, obeyed a stop 
sign, looked in the direction from which traffic would have been 
expected, and proceeded into the intersection where a collision 
occurred. A judgment for the plaintiff obtained in the district court 
was reversed on appeal by the Baltimore City Court, which held the 
boulevard rule applicable and, thus, the plaintiff guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. In vacating and 
remanding, the court of appeals grasped the legislative redefinition 
of the term "right-of-way" (see notes 113-16, supra, and 
accompanying text) seven years after its enactment to hold that 
since the defendant was not proceeding "in a lawful manner," the 
boulevard rule did not apply and the plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law. 
Although the general import of its decision is clear - that a 
driver on a favored road may forfeit his absolute right-of-way and 
the protection of the boulevard rule by proceeding unlawfully - the 
question which the court must now face is what conduct, other than 
driving the wrong way on a one-way street, will constitute 
proceeding unlawfully? An argument can doubtless be made in 
many boulevard cases that the favored driver waS'violating some 
statute or other and was, therefore, proceeding unlawfully. The 
courts may no longer stand firm "like the Rock of Gibraltar," but 
must now involve themselves in the complexities of determining 
upon all the facts of a given case whether the favored driver has lost 
his preference to proceed and, thus, whether the boulevard rule 
applies at all. Guidelines must be formulated, and it is difficult to 
perceive how this might be done other than on a case by case basis. 
As a general rule, violation of a statute is not evidence of 
negligence unless the violation was a proximate cause of the injury 
complained of. Dean v. Redmiles, supra. Perhaps it will be argued by 
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analogy that the violation of a statute should not constitute 
proceeding unlawfully unless the violation was a proximate cause of 
the collision. The problem with that approach is that it gives rise to 
the implication that where the favored driver's conduct is not the 
proximate cause of a collision, he must have been proceeding 
lawfully no matter how he operated his vehicle. On the other hand, 
the court might adopt the approach that any significant violation of 
law by the favored driver will render the boulevard rule inapplicable. 
In short, no single, easy solution to the dilemma presents itself. 
Although the language of the "new" right-of-way statute is taken 
from the Uniform Vehicle Code, note 102 supra, the decisions of 
other states are not likely to be helpful to Maryland's courts because 
other states do not have a boulevard rule. 
If Dean and Covington are indicative of a trend, a judicial 
abrogation of the boulevard rule may be in the offing. For the 
present, however, the boulevard rule has not been renounced; its 
scope of application has been limited to an extent which must await 
determination. 
